My publications on meta-ethics and legal theory aim to advance a better understanding of the relationship between legal and moral objectivity. I am also interested in, and have written on, the methodological problems in legal theory, i.e. the distinction between normative and descriptive jurisprudence, the nature of conceptual analysis, the search for an adequate formulation of the idea of paradigm in law.
My current research is located at the intersection of contemporary philosophy of action, classical and medieval philosophical reflections on intentional action, and legal philosophy. I have written a book, which argues that the classical model of intentional action in terms of the ‘guise of the good’ model a) provides the framework for a sound understanding of the normative and authoritative character of law and b) gives the theoretical grounds to dissolve the paradox of legal authority. The title of the monograph is Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good.
Currently, I am writing a monograph on the philosophical foundations of responsibility for negligence. I advance an Aristotelian-inspired model of deliberation and practical reason, which includes narrow or substandard and aspirational deliberation, to shed light on the phenomenology of inadvertent actions in both law and ethics. If you wish to read and comment on the manuscript, please contact me at v.rodriguez-blanco@surrey.ac.uk.
I am happy to receive research proposals from potential research students on any of the following areas:
a) Philosophical aspects of tort and/or contract law, e.g. causation in tort law, the role of promises in contract Law, the public/ private distinction in the context of conceptions of the self and the law.
b) A philosophical analysis of agency and practical reason to shed light on collective and individual responsibilities in the fields of criminal law, human rights law, tort law and corporate law.
c) Classical philosophical approaches to agency and its impact on specifics fields of substantive law.
d) Methodological issues on theories of human rights.
e) Conceptions of human flourishing and goodness to illuminate substantive law.