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Dworkin's Dignity under the Lens of the Magician of Königsberg

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Ronald Dworkin discusses his view on dignity in the context of providing an interpretive construction that integrates our moral and ethical responsibilities.[1] In our ordinary lives, moral and ethical conceptions seem to pull us in opposite directions. We engage in personal projects, and have values and commitments that contradict and clash with our moral judgments or with what we ought to do categorically. Personal projects, values, and commitments are subject to conditions, for example, talents, wealth, intelligence, socio-economic status, and so on. By contrast, the demands of morality are unconditional. We cannot avoid acting according to a moral demand by excusing ourselves in terms of our circumstances. We can realize certain projects and participate in values if we are motivated to do them and if we have the talents, resources, or intelligence to be able to do them. They are contingent on our psychological make-up, that is, on our inclinations, desires, judgments of value, and circumstances. They do not apply universally and we cannot demand categorically their realization. By contrast, moral values do not depend on our desires or inclinations, socio-economic status, talents, or intelligence. Consequently, every human being can realize and participate in a moral life. Our personal tragedy as human beings arises from the

awareness that a successful life, which entails the realization of our personal projects, values, and commitments, does not *necessarily* mean that we have led a moral life. We cannot show that morality is essential to having a good life. In other words, that having a good life is being moral, or perhaps vice versa, that a moral life will ensure a good life. Disintegration of the relationship between morality and ethics seems inevitable. In an attempt to swim against this current, Dworkin aims to show that integration between morality and ethics, that is, having a good life, is possible. According to him integration is possible if we seek moral responsibilities that will be construed in terms of, and therefore, determined by, our ethical responsibilities. As part of this endeavour Dworkin attacks what might be called 'the independent view'. The independent view cannot integrate morality and ethics because our moral responsibilities are presented as being fixed. According to this view, morality can only be determined by morality itself and therefore ethics is necessarily excluded. By contrast, Dworkin advances what we might call the 'constructivist view'. According to the latter, morality is an interpretive concept and the correct interpretation of what it requires involves interpreting our ethical responsibilities, that is, personal projects, values, and commitments, within certain limiting conditions. However, these limiting conditions cannot be formulated in terms of our duties to others. The key concept that establishes the bridge between our moral and ethical responsibilities is living well. Living well 'means striving to create a good life, but only subject to certain constraints essential to human dignity'. We search for personal projects, commitments, and values that will give us a good life; there are limiting conditions, however, for instance, authenticity and self-respect. Dworkin advances the view that the two principles of authenticity and self-respect give content to the *idea of dignity*. Authenticity entails that you lead a life that suits your situation and values and that you live your life according to them. Self-respect requires that you take yourself seriously; it requires engagement with the idea of 'living well' and that you recognize its importance.

At first glance one could assert that there is a Kantian theme in Dworkin's construction of the idea of dignity. According to Kant free will in accordance to rational nature, which is the unconditional and ultimate objective value, is the source of the dignity of humanity and personality.[2] According to Dworkin, living well is manifested in activities and performances. Our activities and performances have value because we are the source of them and our activities are manifested through our authenticity and self-respect. Thus, we strive and we take ourselves seriously. Our dignity is reflected in our activities, whose ultimate source is us. The problem lies in how to understand the 'us' of the previous sentence. Unlike Kant, Dworkin does not mention that

our rational nature is the source of our dignity. On the contrary, he wishes to establish a distance between his view and the Kantian one. For example, he makes it clear that autonomy and authenticity differ. Let me quote him in full:

> So authenticity is not autonomy, at least as some philosophers understand the protean concept. They suppose that autonomy requires only that some range of choices be left open by the sum of circumstances, whether these be natural or political. A person's autonomy is not threatened, on this view, when government manipulates its community's culture so as to remove or make less eligible certain disapproved ways of living, if an adequate number of choices remain so that he can still exercise the power of choice. Authenticity, on the other hand, as this is defined by the second principle of dignity, is very much concerned with the character as well as the fact of obstacles to choice. (Dworkin 2011: 212n1)

I will argue that Dworkin's limiting condition of dignity, whose defining pillars are self-respect and authenticity, cannot establish the required boundaries to guarantee a place for morality in the ethical domain. As a result the 'constructive model' does not offer a genuine integration between morality and ethics. On the contrary, morality is pushed aside and the remaining space is for ethical responsibilities alone. In Dworkinean language what is left is 'living well', that is, striving to have a good life *without* limiting conditions. In this paper the core argument that I advance is that under Dworkin's constructive model, the 'source' of the performance and activities in our striving to live well is not *necessarily* our rational nature. This is why there is *no room* for morality in Dworkin's constructive model.

In the second section of this chapter, I discuss Dworkin's idea of dignity and his constructive model with the aim of overcoming the separation between morality and ethics. In the third section, I contrast Dworkin's notion of dignity with the Kantian notion of dignity and show that my reading of the Kantian conception of dignity provides opportunity for the integration of ethics and morality. I also discuss a possible objection to my proposal.

Dworkin's Dignity and the Constructive Model

The ideas of self-respect and authenticity give content to Dworkin's conception of dignity, which is the limiting condition in our striving to live well. Self-respect, according to Dworkin, is not a moral claim. It is not the idea that every human being has intrinsic value. It is rather a *normative* claim about attitudes towards ourselves. We should care about our living well, that

our activities and performances have an importance. We recognize our status as beings that perform and act, and this is why we feel miserable when we think that we have not lived well. We have ideas about how to live and we *try* to live up to those ideas. The value is not in the result but in the performance itself. Thus, for example, the value of reading a book is not that the book has been read, but in the reading itself.[3] The value of love lies not in being loved, but in the act of loving. In other words, what counts is the journey rather than the result, that is, the process of doing something and the manifestation of our capacities and limitations in the doing of the thing. The enjoyment is not *merely* the state of mind of being satisfied by the performance.[4] If it were there would be no enjoyment in the doing of thing; we would feel enjoyment only when we succeeded or obtained a result. The enjoyment is also in the recognition that living our lives according to our ideas is important and significant because we value these ideas. The importance to me, for example, of living well is reflected in my self-conception as a person who values, and disregards, certain things and activities. I value and find it appropriate to eat certain foods; to entertain friends in specific ways; to educate my child with certain values; and to read and study specific subjects. I want to do things and activities in *this way* rather than *that* and these ways define my personal identity. Since the endorsement of these values is from the practical point of view,[5] questions about their objectivity or subjectivity, which belong to the theoretical domain, are irrelevant to their importance in our engagement with the world and values. Authenticity, according to Dworkin, refers to the endorsement of who we really are. It is the recognition of our unique individuality and the values and projects that are our own. It is unfolding your life according to what you recognize as your values and appropriate situation. In this way, there is no alienation since you recognize yourself in the results and product of your activities and performances. Your activities and performances are not determined by following conventions, by what ought to be done, or by mere tradition. On the contrary, they are determined by the endorsement of values and situations as appropriate.

Dworkin aspires to integrate morality and ethics by resorting to the idea of living well, in other words, to engaging with a performance *in* life that will be limited by dignity, that is, self-respect and authenticity. (To help clarify) Let us image these two different examples.

Gauguin Borrowing Money from a Friend (Gauguin)

Gauguin has been asked by his wife and children to leave the family home. The family feels that he does not share their values anymore. He has decided

to become a full-time painter after failing to establish a career as salesman in Denmark and provide for his family. He needs money to buy canvasses, brushes, and paints, and decides to borrow some money from a friend. He knows that he cannot repay the money but despite this he promises his friend that he will pay the money back next month. He borrows the money and never pays it back.

Rousseau Abandoning His Family (Rousseau)

Rousseau is living a precarious life and fears that his five children will not have a good education. He decides to leave them for good at a Foundling Hospital where they will have a better future. This gives him the freedom to dedicate his life to philosophy and to write important philosophical works.

Can we say that Gauguin and Rousseau satisfy the constructive model advanced by Dworkin, where morality and ethics are meshed together by the notion of 'living well' within the limiting conditions of self-respect and authenticity? In the first example, Gauguin takes his life seriously, he gives importance to aesthetic values, and he explores new techniques and innovative ideas on what art truly is. Every day he engages in the activity of painting and he produces performance-value. He tries to succeed in bringing about a new way of representing humans, nature, and our understanding of it. He takes himself seriously as a painter and creator of new ways in art. He respects himself and his performance. Gauguin is also authentic since he recognizes and endorses as unique and true to himself the values and appropriate situations of his living as a painter. In the second example, Rousseau takes his life as a philosopher seriously. He engages in thinking and searching for truth and he gives significance and importance to his living well as philosopher. He engages in performance-value and tries to succeed in his philosophical work. He is also authentic because he lives according to values that he endorses and recognizes as unique and true to himself. We see that Rousseau and Gauguin satisfy Dworkin's constructive model, where Gauguin and Rousseau live well within the limiting conditions of dignity, whose content is determined by self-respect and authenticity. It is arguable, however, that neither Gauguin nor Rousseau act morally and in these two cases, therefore, morality and ethics fail to be successfully integrated. Thus, the constructive model, in these examples, does not succeed. I am not resorting here to the philosophical account of morality but to our common conception of morality. When Gauguin makes a false promise to a friend, we would say that he has breached the trust that his friend has put in him. We would say that Gauguin has used his friend for his own purposes without giving his friend the possibility of choosing

how to act. Gauguin's act of lying takes away from his friend the freedom of choosing whether to lend the money or not. Rousseau's abandonment of his children is a renunciation of his moral obligations as a father. We would say that a father has an obligation to *try* as hard as possible to fulfil the basic needs of his children, for example, by providing education, food, protection, care and love, and that Rousseau has failed in his parental obligations. I am not arguing that always being truthful and taking our parental responsibilities seriously are the only right possible actions according to a specific moral philosophy. My argument is that our common sense morality will consider the actions of Gauguin and Rousseau immoral. We could say, therefore, that Dworkin's constructive model cannot explain the integration between ethics and our common sense morality. The puzzle of integration arises precisely at the level of common sense morality where we cannot reconcile our ethical personal projects, commitments, and values with our common sense morality. In Dworkin's constructive model, morality has been pushed aside.

Is there an alternative way of making the integration project feasible? In the next section I offer a reading of Kant's idea of dignity that can provide a platform for a possible integration between ethics and morality.

Acting According to Ends, Freedom, and Dignity in Kant: The Integration Project

The standard discussion of Kant's moral philosophy and his view on dignity aims to understand the relationship between his four key notions, that is, the formula of universal law, the formula of autonomy, the formula of humanity, and the formula of the kingdom of ends. In recent interpretations, privilege has been given to the formula of humanity and the formula of the kingdom of ends over the other formulas.[6] However, the discussion is centred on how best to understand the idea that good will is the unconditioned value that grounds moral action and freedom. Kant distinguishes between the categorical imperative and the hypothetical imperative.[7] In the former case we choose a maxim that we are willing to endorse universally and therefore, our empirical conception of ourselves and the world seems irrelevant for the requirement of universalization. The universalization is unconditional, that is, it does not depend on our personal projects, commitments, desires, or what we value. The categorical imperative is the mark of a moral action. By contrast, the hypothetical imperative is characterized by a condition, namely our personal projects, values, and desires. The idea is that if we aim to pursue an end and we understand that this end can only be achieved through certain means, then it is rational to choose these means to achieve the desirable end. This picture makes more acute the

integration problem. A moral action is possible because of the unconditional good will that is capable of universalizing a maxim of action. If the good will is conditioned empirically, which involves an engagement with personal ends and projects, then the good will is unable to universalize subjective maxims of action and unable to act morally. The possibility of reconciling our moral and ethical responsibilities within this reading of the Kantian framework seems almost impossible. Paradoxically, Kant emphasized our humanity and the *dignity of our humanity*. For Kant, humanity is our capacity to establish our own ends and act according to them. Kant also underscores the *dignity of personality*.[8] Personality seems to be in continuity with our humanity and therefore, presupposes it. When we act according to our personality, we act according to morality. It is, therefore, not an action that is determined by our personal projects and values only. In *Groundwork*[9] Kant refers to both humanity and personality as interchangeable; however, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* he advances the view that personality is not only about our ends, but about moral action. The key issue is whether we can reconcile the realization of our ends and personal projects, our humanity, and our capacity to set our own ends, with the realization of actions that have a moral character, that is our personality. I will argue that the correct way of integrating morality and ethics is *via* an argument that shows that the categorical imperative and the universalization requirement *underpin* our intentional actions, which involve the pursuing of ends and the commitment to personal projects. Consequently, our dignity lies in our capacity to set our own ends, but to set these ends within the limiting conditions of our moral judgments according to the categorical imperative. In this way, the Kantian theoretical framework can reconcile our ethical and moral responsibilities. For a better understanding of this reading of Kant's moral philosophy we need to understand intentional action and the way the categorical imperative underlies the structure of both our intentional action and practical reason.

There has been a predominant conception of intentional action as a mental state that hinders our understanding of the way that *moral requirements can underlie intentional action construed as future-directed actions towards an end*. I now turn to explain the non-standard conception of intentional action which illuminates the relationship between the categorical imperative and actions that are performed to achieve an end.

Understanding the Structure of Intentional Action and Practical Reason

An intentional action is an action that is directed towards ends. Intention is not merely a mental state about the desired end. On the contrary, an intentional

action has a future-directed structure that reveals the underlying practical reasoning of the agent. For example, Gauguin intends to paint some canvasses according to his own understanding of the importance of light, colours, and contemporary explorations of human figures and expressions. He intends to paint some canvasses in Tahiti, where the light is intense and where human expression is different. In order to get to Tahiti he needs to make arrangements to travel there by boat; and he needs to buy canvasses, brushes, and paints. He needs a suitable suitcase for all his painting equipment and so on. However, he does not have any money to do what he intends to do. He, therefore, decides to borrow money from a friend and goes to visit his friend. Let us imagine the following dialogue between a bystander and Gauguin:

Enquirer: Why are you knocking at your friend's door.

Gauguin: To enter into his house and talk to my friend.

Enquirer: Why do you want to talk to your friend?

Gauguin: To borrow some money.

Enquirer: Why do you want to borrow some money?

Gauguin: In order to buy a boat ticket to travel to Tahiti and to buy brushes, canvasses and paints to use there.

Enquirer: Why do you want to travel to Tahiti and paint over there?

Gauguin: Because the light is unique, and I can discover and paint new forms of human expression.

Enquirer: Why do you want to discover and paint new forms of expression?

Gauguin: Because I can transcend myself through art.

Enquirer: Why do you want to transcend yourself through art?

Gauguin: Because this gives meaning to my life and art, and aesthetic experience is the highest value of human beings.

The only way to identify the will and whether it is involved in the action is to understand the action in terms of the description provided by the agent himself. We elicit such a description when we ask '*why*'[10] such and such an action is performed. This way of eliciting the description of the action is called the why–question methodology and is Anscombe's central device in *Intention* for elucidating the connections between the different parts of an action and (our) practical reasoning.[11] There are a number of considerations that need to be taken into account to fully grasp this methodology:

1. An intentional action is, paradigmatically, a successive series of actions directed towards the final end of the action.

2. We know that the explanation finishes because the last step is described in terms of good-making characteristics that make intelligible and illuminate as a coherent whole the successive steps of the action.
3. We do not have different actions but only one action unified by the final intention as a reason for action formulated in terms of good-making characteristics.
4. It is a reason that is given to *others* in a genuine way within a framework of justification, but it is also the reason that the agent gives to *herself/himself*.

Taking these considerations into account, let me now explain the why-question methodology.

Anscombe begins *Intention* by stating that the subject of the book should be studied under three headings: expression of an intention, intentional action, and intention in acting[12] and that all these should be understood as interdependent. Thus, an expression of an intention cannot be understood as a prediction about my future acts nor as an introspective explanation of an intention such as desires, wants, etc. Anscombe tells us, however, that people formulate expressions of intentions that are about the future and that *they turn out to be correct*.[13] How is this possible? In order to answer this question she tries to understand how we can identify intentional actions and demarcate them from non-intentional actions. The logical step is to understand what it means when a person says, 'I have acted with an intention'. Anscombe identifies acting intentionally with acting for a reason or 'reasons for actions' and such acting involves the view that the question *why* applies.[14] In other words, when we act for reasons, we act intentionally and therefore, we are sensitive and responsive to a justificatory framework. If we perform an action 'Φ' and the answers to the *why* questions are either of the following: 'I did not know I was doing Φ'; or 'I was not aware I was doing Φ', then we neither have an intentional action, nor an action performed and guided by reasons. We might have a voluntary action but it is not an intentional one.[15] But if the response has, for example, either of the following forms: 'in order to Φ' or 'because Φ', then we might have a prima facie case for an intentional action or an action done for reasons. In other words, reasons, so to speak, show themselves in intentional action and indicate, by 'showing themselves', how they are able to operate and be part of the agent's practical reasoning.

Do we have any control over the truthfulness of the answer prompted by the question 'Why?' Anscombe points out that we have a set of contextual conditions that enable us to say whether or not the person has expressed his genuine intentions.[16] For example, if someone is poisoning a river with toxic

substances and we ask him, 'Why are you doing this?', his response might be 'I am just doing my job', we can verify whether this is part of his routine job, but if it is not we have reason to think that his response is not genuine.

Intentional action or an action done for reasons involves a successive number of steps or actions and subsequently a successive number of reasons that explain each step, but when do we know that the explanation provided by the agent can stop? Anscombe tells us that the explanation and justification stop when the end of the action is described in terms of what is good or desirable. The final end of the action is something, that is, a state of affairs, events, facts, objects that *seem or appear* to be good or desirable to the agent. The state of affairs, event, fact or object is believed to be a good sort of thing by the agent. In some ways, this is the most common sense and *naive* explanation of our actions.

For example, when I collect you at the train station I do not say that I collect you because I am in the mental state of desiring to collect you at the train station and have the mental state of believing and remembering that this is that kind of action. On the contrary, *in order to pick you up at the train station* I start my car, drive down the road, park my car at the train station and get out of my car and enter the train station. The successive steps of action find unity and intelligibility in my *reason* as a good-making characteristics that, for example, you are my friend and it is good to welcome friends at the train station. Gauguin intends to borrow money *in order to* buy tickets to go to Tahiti and buy canvasses, brushes, and paints, and he does this *in order to* discover new ways of human expression, and he intends to discover new ways of human expression because he finds aesthetic experiences the most valuable kind of experiences. Aesthetic experience as a value is the good-making characteristic that makes intelligible his successive series of actions.

The core motivation behind the why-question methodology is to pay attention to the structure or articulation of an intentional action.[17] The action is *not given* and therefore, the issue is not to discover the propositional attitudes, that is, beliefs and desires, that will explain the action. The issue is to unveil the structure of the intentional action to understand whether there is an action or not.

In Anscombe, evaluation and motivation do not separate. I ask, from the deliberative viewpoint, '*What* should I truly do?' and '*Why* should I do this or that?' The answers to these questions involve both an apprehension and an evaluation of the state of affairs or facts of the world and this entails, so to speak, a theoretical engagement with the world. In some way we might say that the question is formulated from the deliberative point of view, but the answer should be given as if it were a theoretical question.

We also say that the agent knows the reasons for his actions without observation. This means that the reasons for actions are transparent to the agent. An expression of an intention, according to Anscombe, is not mainly from the third-person perspective.[18] The knowledge that we have about our body's position is not known *mainly* by observation; it might be *aided* by observation, but I do not need to take a theoretical or observational stance to know that my legs are crossed whilst I sit typing on my laptop. Anscombe thus, tells us that intentional action is a 'sub-class of non-observational knowledge'.[19]

Gareth Evans in *The Varieties of Reference* refers to the phenomenon of 'transparency' that characterizes beliefs:

> In making a self-description of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world. If someone asks me 'Do you think there is going to be a Third World War?', I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question 'Will there be a Third World War'? I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that *p* by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether *p*. (Evans 1982: 225)[20]

Ludwig Wittgenstein asserts:

> 477 What does it mean to assert that 'I believe p' says roughly the same as 'p'? We react in roughly the same way when anyone says the first and when he says the second; if I said the first and someone didn't understand the words 'I believe', I should repeat the sentence in the second form, and so on.
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> 478 Moore's paradox may be expressed like this: 'I believe p' says roughly the same as 'p'; but 'Suppose I believe that p…' does not say the same as 'Suppose p…'
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> 490 The paradox is this: the *supposition* may be expressed as follows: 'Suppose this went inside me and *that* outside'; but the assertion that this is going on inside me asserts: this is going on outside me. As suppositions the two propositions about the inside and the outside are quite independent, but not as assertions. (1980)[21]

For both Evans' and Wittgenstein's answers about whether I 'believe p' are outward-looking. I cannot answer the question whether I believe that it is raining, for example, without looking through the window, or reading the weather forecast. To answer such a question in terms of my introspective states seems absurd. We do not need to look inward at our states of mind to know whether or not it is raining.

Following in the steps of Evans and Wittgenstein, Richard Moran explains transparency as follows:

> With respect to belief, the claim of transparency is that from within the first-person perspective, I treat the question of my belief about P as equivalent to the question of the truth of P. What I think we can see now is that the basis for this equivalence hinges on the role of deliberative considerations about one's attitudes. For what the 'logical' claim of transparency requires is the deferral of the theoretical question 'What do I believe?' to the deliberative question 'What am I to believe?' And in the case of the attitude of belief, answering a deliberative question is a matter of determining what is true. When we unpack the idea in this way, we see that the vehicle of transparency in each case lies in the requirement that I address myself to the question of my state of mind in a *deliberative* spirit, deciding and declaring myself on the matter, and not confront the question as a purely psychological one about the beliefs of someone who happens also to be me. (2001: 62–3)[22]

We can take the idea of transparency and see how it applies to reasons for actions. If I act intentionally I act according to reasons for actions, therefore I *believe*[23] that I am acting intentionally for reasons as good-making characteristics, but if the transparency condition is sound, I do not need to look at my mental state to know whether I have the belief in my intentional action for reasons that for *me* are good-making characteristics, I just look outward to the facts, objects, and state of affairs of the world. In this way, my belief that I am acting intentionally and that I have reasons for acting as good-making characteristics is transparent. The idea of transparency in terms of reasons for actions can be formulated as follows, 'I can report on my own reasons for actions, not by considering my own mental states or theoretical evidence about them, but by considering the reasons themselves which I am immediately aware of.'

When I say that I intend to get up at six o'clock tomorrow morning to drive you to the train station because you are my friend and one should always help friends even in little ways, I know that I intend to act for such reasons. I do not need to look at my mental state to know that I have such reasons, I look outward to the world, my car, your presence in my house and the fact that it takes ten minutes to drive to the train station from my house. I have *groundless* knowledge of my reasons for action. It is not incorrigible.[24] Let us suppose that I discover that you are not truly my friend and that, therefore, my reason of driving you to the station because you are my friend is a mistaken one. However, the way I attain knowledge of my reasons for action does not depend on an inference from my observations or other data about myself. This entails that we have certain capacities, not only conceptual, but also practical.

I am also able to exercise control over my actions because I can direct myself towards the end of my action as described by the reasons for actions as good-making characteristics and I can change the movements of my body if I discover, aided by observation, that I am not doing what I intended to do (Theophrastus Principle). Thus, let us suppose that I am making an espresso and mistakenly find myself about to pour milk into the cup, then I do not say 'I am not making an espresso after all, I am actually making a latte, that's all right.' On the contrary, I change my movements and stop my action of pouring the milk into the cup. The world fits my intentions, I transform the state of affairs through my actions to fit what I intend and am committed to perform, whereas in theoretical knowledge my beliefs fit the world. In this way, I do not need observational knowledge to know that I intend to make an espresso, but I can be aided by observation to know the results of my intention.

Groundless knowledge of our reasons entails not only the capacity to act for reasons, but also includes *knowing how* to act intentionally according to reasons for actions in the specific context. Following legal rules entails *know how* about how to follow the legal rules because of their grounding reasons. But this does not mean that this groundless knowledge is not factual. On the contrary, it is knowledge about the world. Anscombe puts this as follows:

> Say I go over to the window and open it. Someone who hears me moving calls out: 'What are you doing making that noise?', I reply, 'Opening the window.' I have called such a statement knowledge all along; and precisely because in such a case what I say is true, I do open the window; and that means that the window is getting opened by the movements of the body out of whose mouth those words come. But I don't say the words like this, 'Let me see, what is this body bringing about? Ah yes! The opening of the window.'[25]

Our practical knowledge is also factual. When I intend to open the window and make the necessary movements with my hands, I know that I am opening the window and that I am actually opening the window.

Can we understand what we are doing *because* we *observe* what we are doing? If we take a theoretical stance towards our own actions then we might argue that there is a kind of alienation concerning the identity of ourselves and our actions;[26] in one sense the action is lost because we do not look at the goal or object towards which our actions are directed, but we look at ourselves doing the action. We do not look outwards, but inwards and we lose the object or goal that we aim to bring about. Imagine that I am making an espresso and begin to reflect on the movements of my hands; I see myself putting the coffee beans into the espresso machine, look at the coffee flowing

into the cup, and smile at the thought of a fresh coffee. At some point it seems that I will lose the action of 'making an espresso'. It is impossible to be Narcissus. O'Shaughnessy asks whether this impossibility is really about the impossibility of doing two things at the same time, rather than a matter of the character of practical knowledge because if this is the case, then it is a quantitative matter and trivial. O'Shaughnessy argues that it is a matter of logic, 'Just as I cannot be going north and south at the same time, so I cannot be reading a book and playing tennis at the same time.'[27] Thus, pathological cases are explained as the separation of the acting and the observing self.[28]

Aristotle in *De Anima*[29] points out 'it is always the object of desire which produces movement, [and] this is either good or the apparent good' (433 a27–9), and in the *Eudemian Ethics* he establishes:

> The end is by nature always a good and one about which people deliberate in particular, as a doctor may deliberate whether he is to give a drug, or the general where he is to pitch his camp; in these there is a good, an end, which is the best without qualification; but contrary to nature, and by perversion, not the good but only an apparent good may be the end. (1227a19–22)[30]

How can values actualized in particulars provide reasons for actions? When we begin to deliberate about what to do, we begin by judging whether something, that is, an object, state of affairs or event, is good or not. We engage in the process of valuing things and we start to desire that this particular thing obtains. Values are instantiated by the good-making characteristics of objects and states of affairs and they become reasons for actions. Pure desires, by contrast, are passive and are not tied to our valuing processes. Pure desires are a pure state of the mind without object. For example, the pure desire for pleasure does not aim at a specific object, but at its own satisfaction or fulfilment and also at *eliminating* itself. When making valuations we have in our minds the object and the satisfaction of attaining the object. Therefore, as Watson has said, *desires are mute on the question of what is good.*[31] Values and pure desires are, hence, two independent sources of motivation.[32]

The Integration Problem under the Kantian View: Re-enacting Dignity

Our ethical responsibilities are shaped by what we value and our intentional actions are connected to our chosen values that provide the good-making characteristics of our actions. However, our moral responsibilities cannot be determined by our values. What we value is contingent upon who we are and what we care about. It is dependent on whether we endorse the valued thing

wholeheartedly and on our constitution and character. By contrast, morality has an unconditional character. So, how we can make room for the high demands of the categorical imperative and the universalization requirement within the domains of the contingent self that values and pursues personal projects? The core idea that I aim to advance is that the notion of intentional action as construed in the previous section enables us to accommodate the integration of ethics with morality. We intend ends as good-making characteristics and these ends are the reasons that ground our actions. They are transparent to us and we engage in their realization in the world. However, *morality and ethics can be integrated* if the realization of these ends presupposes that we engage with maxims that we are willing to endorse in a universal way. We do not intend the maxims since we can only intend ends. Thus, the maxims operate as the *grounding* of the relevant practical judgment and are present and *manifested* in the execution of the intentional action. Let me illustrate this point using the examples of Gauguin and Rousseau. Gauguin intends to become a painter by profession, to buy a boat ticket to travel to Tahiti, and to buy canvasses, brushes, and paints. The limiting condition of the categorical imperative underlies his intentional action. He cannot lie to his friend about being able to repay the loan because 'lying to a friend' is not a maxim that he would be willing to endorse universally. If he lies to his friend he takes away his friend's freedom to choose. Thus, he *does not intend* the universal moral law but when he acts according to his intentional action and brings about the intended state of affairs, for example, a career as a painter and travelling to Tahiti, he performs his actions *in respect of* the moral law. Similarly, Rousseau intends to become a philosopher, he intends to write important books and in order to do this he needs to dedicate most of his time to thinking and writing. He cannot intend this by acting against a maxim that he is not willing to endorse universally. By abandoning his children he will breach his parental obligations and inflict emotional harm on his children. He should *try* to pursue his end of becoming a philosopher but, at the same time, act according to the underlying maxims that he is willing to endorse universally. Thus, for example, he should provide for his children's needs and, when he is not reading or writing, aim to spend time with his children.

The general idea is that we act intentionally, (that is, we have a future-directed intention that aims at an end which is transparent to us and is presented as having good-making characteristics) and underlying this structure of an intentional action are maxims of conduct that we should be willing to endorse universally. The latter provide the limiting conditions of the action.

So far I have argued in favour of a reading of Kant's moral philosophy that integrates our ethical and moral responsibilities. When we act intentionally

we set our own ends and personal projects but their underlying maxims are under the scrutiny of a limiting condition, that is, a universalizing requirement. Dworkin might object that there is no genuine integration in this model that combines intentional action as future-directed actions towards good-making characteristics shaped by the categorical imperative. Thus, the concept of morality, Dworkin could object, remains fixed and therefore our ethical responsibilities, that is, our personal projects, values, and commitments, are determined by what is right. Therefore, the 'right' action trumps the 'good' action. In other words, what we want, that is, personal projects, personal commitments, values, is determined by what is morally correct. But this objection misunderstands the connection between underlying maxims of the structure of intentional action, the nature of intentional actions and its connections to our personal projects, values, and commitments. First, the limiting condition is a *formal* limiting condition and therefore it is not a substantively fixed moral judgment. The categorical imperative is not telling us what to do in any substantive form. On the contrary, it regulates our intentional actions and their ends, that is, personal projects, values and commitments. The categorical imperative *underlies and therefore regulates or grounds the maxims of conduct* of the structure of intentional action and practical reason. Second, it is misleading to present our moral requirements as clashing with our values, personal projects, and commitments. We intend the latter but we do not intend the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative as a limiting condition establishes the boundaries of what *is permissible* to intend. On my reading of Kant, the categorical imperative is a way of executing and realizing an intention and therefore, an end.[33] For example, imagine the moral dilemma of Gauguin. Gauguin is facing a dilemma between staying with his family and fulfilling his duty as a father, or travelling to Tahiti and becoming a painter. Fulfilling his duty as a father might involve renouncing his beliefs and convictions as a painter and would probably also involve trying to become a successful businessman in order to provide for his family. In the dilemma his personal project of becoming a painter clashes with his moral duty of providing for his children. For some critics of Kantianism, Gauguin needs to choose between either his ethical or moral duties. By contrast, on the reading of Kant that I have advanced, Gauguin can fully develop his personal project as a painter, but in his intentional actions he is limited by the categorical imperative. He needs to keep trying to experiment with painting (that is, through exploring new concepts of human expressions), but within the limitation of fulfilling his parental duties. Perhaps he could travel alone to Tahiti for few months while ensuring that the basic needs of his children are satisfied. His parental duties would involve communication, caring, and

loving. He might need to convey to his family the importance of his new identity in art and his transformation as an artist. As Williams has clearly argued,[34] we cannot imagine a *human and rich* life without personal projects. It does not make sense to say that your intention is to be moral and that in all your actions you *intend to* follow the categorical imperative. This way of presenting the categorical imperative makes human agency poor and formalistic. The categorical imperative is a *form* and in the case of Gauguin, it would have no subject matter. It would be the conduct of a moral fetishist: an intention of the form *because of* the form itself. This cannot be what Kant was trying to convey. In my interpretation our intentions are multiple and varied. Our personal projects and therefore intentions might be to teach, to learn, to love, to paint, to think. In general, to have a good life which can only be defined by our chosen ends. For rational and free creatures such as human beings are, all these ends need to presuppose a limiting condition which is best formulated as the categorical imperative. The integration project is fully achieved under this reading of Kant because we can lead good lives that are limited by formal moral requirements. The formality of the moral requirements instead of being empty achieves a new force and appeal. The moral permissibility is constructed around our conception of good life. Human dignity is achieved because we set our own ends and in their realization we impose on ourselves limiting conditions. Individual dignity lies in the fact that individuals have the capacity to pursue personal projects respecting the moral law, and respect for the dignity of others is achieved through the recognition that others set their own personal projects that respect the categorical imperative. You also recognize the dignity of others who also have the capacity to set their own personal projects in ways that would respect the categorical imperative, that is, no degrading themselves to immoral acts. The dignity of humanity and personality is the corollary of recognizing our capacity to have a good life according to limiting moral conditions.

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In chapter 9 of *Justice for Hedgehogs*, Dworkin sets himself the difficult task of showing that the integration of our ethical responsibilities, that is, values, personal projects, commitments, with our moral responsibilities is possible. The idea that we can live well within the limits of a conception of dignity that focuses on self-respect and authenticity is the key argument advanced by Dworkin to demonstrate the integration between ethics and morality. I have argued that Dworkin's conception of dignity is not sufficiently robust to guarantee the desired integration. Self-respect and authenticity cannot ensure

that our rational nature will set the limits of our ethical actions in living well. Therefore, in Dworkin's 'constructive model', morality collapses into ethics. I have shown that there is a plausible Kantian reading of the relationship between action that pursues ends and the categorical imperative that can guarantee the integration of morality and ethics. However, the success of this reading of Kant requires a better understanding of the non-standard conception of intentional action. Intentional action is construed as a future-directed process that unfolds within time and manifests the structure of practical reason. It has been argued that when we integrate our ethical and moral lives, the categorical imperative underlies the process of intentional action and also manifests itself in the structure of practical reason. In this way, we recognize the dignity of our humanity and personality in our living well within moral conditions.

Notes and References

1. Ronald Dworkin. 2011. *Justice for Hedgehogs*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard: Harvard University Press. pp. 191–218.
2. Immanuel Kant. 2012. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, tr. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6:387, 6:392, 6:420, 6:462); 2002. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. tr. Arnulf Zweig. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4:435, 4:436; 1997. *The Critique of Practical Reason*. tr. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5:71, 5:87, 5:88. According to Allen W. Wood. 2008. *Kantian Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, the dignity of humanity is the first step towards the most complete idea of dignity which is the 'dignity of personality'.
3. For an explanation of the distinction between process and result in action, see chapters 3 and 4, of my 2014 book. *Law and Authority Under the Guise of the* Good. Oxford: Hart-Bloomsbury Publishing.
4. See Gary Watson. 1975. 'Free Agency', *Journal of Philosophy*. 72(8): 205, for a rejection of the satisfaction model of desire in favour of the value-model of actions.
5. This crucial argument is overlooked by Dworkin but I think it is needed to make sense of his view on performance value and his attacks on all theoretical attempts to undermine objectivity in practical reason (see his discussion on Archimedeanism in 'Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It' (1996) *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. 87 and *Law's Empire*. 1986. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. See also Dworkin (2011: 209). For a full discussion of this point see my book *Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Book,* above (n4).
6. Christine Korsgaard. 1996. *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and 1996. *Sources of Normativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7. Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, above (n2): 4:414 and 4:415.
8. Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals,* above (n2), 6:462.
9. Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, above (n2).
10. Moran and Stone explain the why-question methodology as follows: 'Hence all psychic forms are performance modifiers: insofar as they are employable in action-explaining answers to the question "why?", they express forms of being on-the-way-to-but not-yet having Φ-ed, of already stretching oneself toward this end'. See R. Moran and M. Stone. 2009. 'Anscombe on Expression of Intention', in Constantine Sandis (ed.), *New Essays in the Explanation of Action*. Basingstoke: Palgrave. p. 148.
11. Anscombe's exposition follows very closely Aquinas's explanation of intentional action. Anthony John Patrick Kenny. 1979. *Aristotle's Theory of the Will*. New Haven: Yale University Press, points out that Aquinas' model should be understood more as a *Gestalt* psychology. Recent work on Anscombe emphasizes the point that acting intentionally should be interpreted as a series of successive steps towards an action. See Moran and Stone. 2008. 'Anscombe on Expression of Intention' (n10 above) and Thompson. 2008. *Life and Action*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 85–119.
12. Moran and Stone in 'Anscombe on Expression of Intention' (n10 above) explain the transformation of these three headings in the post-*Intention* literature. Most of the authors ignore the heading 'expression of an intention'and conflate the other two subheadings: intentional action and the intention with which the action was committed. Consequently, intention becomes a mental state. 'Given the possibility of "pure" intending, it becomes hard to see how this category could fail to designate a mental state, attitude or disposition of some kind. So the division of 'intentions' now takes shape around the philosophical polestar of the division between mind and world: two notions of intentions find purchase only where there is behaviour causing things to happen; a third refers to a mental state, attitude or disposition which, though in some way is present in such behaviour, is also abstractable from it and capable of existing on its own' (p. 137).
13. Elizabeth Anscombe. 1957. *Intention*. Oxford: Blackwell (2nd Edition, 1963). pp. 3–4.
14. Anscombe, *Intention*. pp. 4–6.
15. Anscombe, *Intention*. p. 17.
16. Anscombe, *Intention*. p. 25.
17. Candace Vogler. 2001. 'Anscombe on Practical Inference', in Elijah Millgram (ed.) *Varieties of Practical Reasoning*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT University Press.
18. Anscombe, *Intention*. pp. 2–3.
19. Anscombe, *Intention*. p. 8.
20. Gareth Evans. 1982. *The Varieties of Reference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Roy Edgeley. 1969. *Reason in Theory and Practice*. London: Hutchinson and Co.
21. Ludwig Wittgenstein. 1980. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

22. Richard Moran. 2001. *Authority and Estrangement*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
23. Setiya defines the connection between belief and acting intentionally as follows, 'When someone is acting intentionally, there must be something he is doing intentionally, not merely trying to do, in the belief that he is doing it'. K. Setiya. 2010. *Reasons without Rationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 41.
24. Keith S. Donnelan. 1963. 'Knowing What I Am Doing', *Journal of Philosophy*. 60. pp. 401, 403 argues that there is a difference between our knowledge of having a headache, being in anger, in pain and practical knowledge that is non-observational. In the latter case, the knowledge is corrigible whereas the former not. We revise the statements of our intentions and we can make mistakes about them. However, observation is not the basis of our knowledge, we cannot *infer* from our observations our intentions. What we correct is the *result* or purpose of our intentions.
25. Anscombe, *Intention*. pp. 28–9.
26. Moran, *Authority and Estrangement*, explores the nature of this theoretical stance towards our deliberative understanding of our actions. He makes an important connection between the Sartrean notion of 'bad faith'and the theoretical stance that we might take towards our actions (pp. 77–83).
27. Brian O'Shaughnessy. 1963. 'Observation and the Will', *The Journal of Philosophy*. p. 380.
28. See L. Bortolotti and M.R. Broome. 2008. 'Delusional Beliefs and Reason-Giving', *Philosophical Psychology*. p. 821.
29. Aristotle. 1968. *De Anima.* tr. D.W. Hamlyn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
30. Aristotle. 1952. *Eudemian Ethics.* tr. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. See also Aquinas. 2006. *Summa Theologicae*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, paperback edition, Latin and English texts, edited by Gilby, 1a2ae,8,1.
31. Watson, 'Free Agency' (n5).
32. See Watson, 'Free Agency' (n5) for a contemporary defense of this platonic distinction between two sources of motivation. See also Plato *Phaedrus*, 237e–8e In: *Plato Complete Works,* John M. Cooper (ed.), A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff (tr.), Indianapolis: Hackett (1997).
33. My reading of Kant does have similarities with Barbara Herman's reading in *The Moral of Judgment*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1993). However, my reading differs from hers on the fact that my focus in on action and the display of the activity. On my reading the categorical imperative is practical all the way through and is manifested in the action.
34. Bernard Williams. 1973. *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.